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1: Introduction
On December 17, 1992, Mexico, the USA and Canada signed an agreement
to open up trade to each other in merchandise and services over a period not
exceeding 15 years.  This agreement is the first free trade agreement between
partners of such different size and stage of development, and as such is of unique
interest.  The NAFTA ( North American Free Trade Agreement) capped a long
period of sweeping Mexican reforms, all geared to reorient the economy away
from Government intervention towards an open, private sector based trading
environment. The NAFTA, following a similar, although less sweeping agreement
between Canada and the USA concluded about ten years earlier, extends this
process and cements it into an international treaty.
An analysis of the NAFTA is, moreover, of wider interest.  As progress
with the multilateral approach to trade liberalization has slowed down, bilateral
FTAs are increasingly en vogue as an alternative way of breaking down barriers to
trade.  As long as a FTA does not lead to higher tariffs to third parties, the
agreement is in fact GATT legal and is considered compatible with the multilateral
channel pursued under GATT.  We do not pursue the strategic issues raised by
this block-wise approach to global trade liberalization, but focus on the
consequences of the NAFTA on the countries involved, with special emphasis on
the smaller and less developed partner, in this case Mexico.
There are a variety of channels through which NAFTA will have an impact
2on Mexican welfare.  There are the standard static effects of welfare changes:
allocative efficiency gains, changes in the extent economies of scale are exploited,
second best interactions in imperfectly competitive markets, shifts in rental
incomes and so on.  Most of these factors are likely to lead to small welfare gains
simply because the trade barriers are not that high to begin with, at least outside
agriculture and services.  
Of more interest, although much harder to assess, are the dynamic effects
one can expect.  Much of those dynamic effects are likely to stem from increased
foreign presence in Mexican markets.  There is empirical evidence linking a
foreign presence in a sector to faster productivity growth (Blomstrom and Wolff
(1989)).  Moreover, increased foreign entry might have a strongly pro-competitive
effect in Mexico's highly protected service industries, which in turn will greatly
affect competitiveness in especially manufacturing.  Thus NAFTA's impact on
market structure and DFI in Mexico is likely to be of key importance for long term
productivity benefits of NAFTA to materialize.  That impact is therefore the focus
of this paper.
The NAFTA negotiations have generated a large literature attempting to
measure the welfare effects a NAFTA would lead to (See Shiells (1992) for a
compendium of quantitative studies).  Most of this literature uses static
computable general equilibrium models (cf for example Robinson et alii (1992),
Bachrach and Mizrahi (1992), Roland-Holst et alii (1992)), without attempting to
endogenize DFI, market structure or in any other way address potential dynamic
gains from trade.  Only one or two studies focus on dynamic aspects (McCleery
(1992), Young and Romero (1992)).  Of those, McCleery (1992) has such a high
3level of aggregation (traded/non-traded goods) that credible modelling of the
trade distortions NAFTA is supposed to remove is not really possible.  Romero
and Young (1992) have more detail but focus their entire analysis on the impact of
the NAFTA on Mexico's cost of capital and from there on Mexico's steady state
capital stock.  Foreign investment is not considered.
The theoretical framework we adopt highlights several salient features of
this agreement. One, the countries involved are clearly of very unequal size:
Mexico's GDP is about 3% of the combined GDP of the USA and Canada (USC). 
Such asymmetries are crucial in location choice if trading costs are significant and
economies of scale are present (Krugman and Venables (1990)).  Trading costs
could be caused by explicit tariffs, costs of services required to effect trade, or, the
factor highlighted in Krugman and Venables (1990), transport costs. Two, wage
costs are dramatically different in Mexico and the USC, an issue of obvious
importance for location choice of firms.  Three, although we focus the location
choice analysis on the industrial sector, both wage differences and trading costs in
that sector will be affected significantly by the opening up of agriculture and of
financial and transport services envisaged under this agreement.  These sectors
will therefore be brought into the analysis, although in a somewhat sketchy
manner.  Four, there is a significant third party, mostly trading with and investing
in the US, with a clear vulnerability to aggressive trade policy in the US: Japan. 
Because of the third party interest, we take a three-country approach to modelling
the impact of the NAFTA on DFI: Mexico, the US and Canada (USC) and the Rest
of the World (RW).
Agricultural trade liberalization is likely to lead to major income
4redistributions inside Mexico and therefore presents a special set of adjustment
problems in its own right; these are analyzed elsewhere (Levy and van
Wijnbergen (1992a,b)).  However, because of its large impact on labor markets,
one should expect significant interactions between agricultural trade liberalization
on the one hand, and industry trade liberalization and DFI on the other.  In
particular, wage costs play an important role in DFI decisions. We therefore
decided to take a full-fledged General Equilibrium approach to the Mexico side of
the model.  However, because of the size difference between Mexico on the one
hand and USC and RW on the other, wage and capital costs in USC and RW are
kept exogenous.
The industrial sector in Mexico is modeled with great care.  In particular
the cost structure is fully based on empirical estimation, incorporating economies
of scale where empirical evidence supports that assumption.  Moreover, we
explicitly endogenize the role of the services sector in both production and trade.
Finally, an important feature of the analysis is the endogeneity of market structure
and degree of competitiveness (as measured by number of firms active in an
industry), both in Mexico and in the other two geographical segments of the
model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the
structure of the model used.  Section 3 describes the data used to estimate various
parameters in the model and to calibrate the macroeconomic structure.  Section 4
presents the results.  We first analyse the gains from industrial trade liberalization
Mexico can expect if it would liberalise unilaterally (as it has done to a substantial
degree in the past five years). We then demonstrate the additional gains and DFI
5impact Mexico can expect from the matching US liberalization.  Next we assess
the impact on DFI and welfare aspects of complementing the industrial
deregulation of trade by free trade in agriculture and opening up of financial
services to foreign entry.  Finally we show how the potential use of trade policy in
the US against the third party influences DFI decisions in Mexico.  Section 5
concludes.
2: Model Structure
The model divides the world into three countries, Mexico, the US and
Canada (USC) and the rest of the world (RW).  Mexico is described by a full
general equilibrium model with endogenous factor prices.  In USC and RW, some
industrial sectors are described by partial equilibrium models of industry supply
and demand. However, in USC and RW the cost of capital and labor costs are
considered exogenous to the experiments looked at in this paper.  This seems in
keeping with the size difference between Mexico on the one hand and the other
two regions on the other.  The Mexican economy is divided into 16 sectors, listed
in table 1.   Sectors may be perfectly or imperfectly competitive, as indicated by an
X in the first two columns of that table.
Table 1: Sectoral listing.
Industry Perfect Imperfect Exports Imports
competition competition
1:Agriculture     X     X
2:Oil extracting & refining     X    X
3:Food processing         X    X     X
4:Other food     X    X
5:Textiles     X    X
66:Apparel     X     X
7:Heavy chemicals      X    X     X
8:Other chemicals &          X    X            X
pharmaceuticals
9:Steel      X    X     X
10:Electrical products      X    X     X
11:Electronics      X    X     X
12:Vehicles      X    X     X
13:Vehicle parts      X    X     X
14:Other manufacturing &      X     X
minerals
15:Transport,communications &      X
finance
16:Other services      X
2.1 Perfectly competitive industries 
Perfectly competitive sectors are assumed to produce a homogenous output. 
This output is tradeable internationally, except in the sector "other services".  The
output of tradable perfectly competitive sectors is assumed to be perfectly
substitutable with goods available on the world market.  The world price is
assumed given; Mexico is a price taker in these sectors.
This assumption has three consequences.  First, there cannot be two way
trade in the output of any of the perfectly competitive sectors, so we represent
trade by the net trade only;  (the direction of net trade is indicated by X in
columns 3 and 4 of table 1).  Second, and contrary to all the CGE studies
mentioned before (cf Shiells (1992)), there are no welfare effects arising from
induced terms of trade changes in these products.  We regard this as a desirable
property of the model, since there is no evidence that Mexico has significant
monopoly power in world markets for any of the industries we characterise as
7perfectly competitive.  Third, since demand curves for these goods are horizontal,
quantities must be determined by supply.  We assume that there is a specific
factor in each of these sectors, generating upward sloping supply curves.
2.2 Imperfectly competitive sectors
Each firm in an imperfectly competitive sector produces its own product
variety and operates under increasing returns to scale.  In each sector, firms are
located in Mexico, USC and RW, and compete in each of these markets, so
generating intra-industry trade.  We assume that the three markets are segmented,
and that firms are Cournot competitors in the Mexican market.  We ignore
oligopolistic interaction in USC and RW; there firms derive market power only
from product differentiation (the Chamberlinian 'large group' case).
 A major innovation of the model is that we allow for firms of different
nationalities to be located in each country, although to keep down the
dimensionality of the model we do not allow all possible combinations of
nationality and location.  We assume that: (a) Mexican owned firms operate only
in Mexico; (b) USC firms operate in USC and in Mexico; and (c) RW firms operate
in Mexico, USC and RW.  This gives 6 types of firms, identified by nationality (of
ownership) and location (of production);  all firms of a particular type are
symmetric.   These location pattern assumptions are chosen so as to focus sharply
on decisions concerning DFI in Mexico.
Unit costs depend on the level of a firm's output, through economies of
scale; on their location, via factor prices; and on their nationality, which
determines the efficiency of their technology.
8Demand for output of each of the imperfectly competitive sectors is
allocated in a three-stage way, according to a nested structure of CES sub-utility
functions.  Given expenditure on the sector as a whole (stage 1), the consumer
divides expenditure between products of different nationality within that sector
(stage 2).  Finally, expenditure on products of a given sector and nationality is
allocated over the different varieties (stage 3).  All products of a particular
nationality and sector enter the consumer's utility function symmetrically
(although their prices may differ because of their location of production).  The
Hicksian elasticity of demand for consumption of the aggregate of all products of
a given nationality is denoted 0.  The Hicksian elasticity of demand for such a
single product is denoted ,.  
This demand structure implies, among other things, that consumers do not
care about the location of production of a commodity, although they may care
about its nationality.  In other words consumers know that a Mexican product is
different from a USC product, but they do not care whether the USC product has
been produced in USC or in Mexico.  The reason for making this assumption is that
in many if not most cases, consumers actually do not know where products have
been made.
We shall assume that products of a given nationality are much closer
substitutes than aggregate commodities of different nationality (0 > ,).  There is
another source of asymmetry:  other parameters positioning demand curves may
be nationality specific, so it is still possible that there are perceived differences
according to nationality of firms apart from the difference captured by 0 ≠ ,. 
We assume that firms located in Mexico but not of Mexican nationality use
      In USC and RW we ignore oligopolistic interaction, so this assumption is not1
restrictive.
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Mexican labor, but import their capital requirement, and repatriate after-tax
earnings on capital and pure profits.  Foreign firms in Mexico are controlled
independently of firms in their home country /, and produce distinct varieties. 1
We think that this is empirically the case in most of the industries we study,
although it does mean that our modelling of foreign direct investment does not
capture multinationals sourcing a particular product from different locations
simultaneously.
One sector which plays a particularly important role is the services sector,
comprising transport, communications and finance.  This is different from other
imperfectly competitive sectors in so far as its output is non-tradable, and
(initially) supplied only by Mexican firms.  An important feature of the model is
the explicit incorporation of services as a cost factor in trade.  As discussed before,
such factors can interact with economies of scale to yield dramatic shifts in
location choice of firms across countries.  The precise way this is modeled is that
exporting requires as an input the output of sector 15, transport, communications
and finance.  We assume the supplier of the services is located in the country from
which the exports originate.  Of course the eventual incidence of the service cost
will in standard ways depend on relative elasticities.
2.3 General Equilibrium
Each sector of the economy uses the output of other sectors as
      The US formally uses the source principle for US firms, with a tax credit2
arrangement to offset foreign tax payments.  But profits made abroad only lead to a
domestic tax liability once repatriated, which brings it close to a residence based
system.  
10
intermediates, and uses three primary factors -- skilled labour, unskilled labour,
and capital.  Labour is assumed to be internationally immobile but mobile
domestically. However, we assume that in agriculture the value marginal product
of unskilled labour is only 50% of the wage elsewhere in the economy.  The
persistence of such intersectoral wage differences is well documented for the US
(cf Katz and Summers (1989)); similar evidence for Mexico is reported in Levy and
van Wijnbergen (1992), on which our estimate of 50% is based.  Any reallocation
of labour out of agriculture therefore has beneficial welfare effects.  Issues of
Mexican-US migration, left out by these assumptions, can be judged from the
impact of the various experiments on the unskilled wage in Mexico.  In perfectly
competitive sectors some capital is assumed to be sector specific, an assumption
made for reasons explained earlier.  International capital flows take place in the
form of foreign direct investment only, as described above.  The price of the two
types of labour and of capital are therefore determined by supply and demand
within the Mexican economy.
The Mexican government receives revenue from factor taxation, profits
taxation, and a consumption tax.  All sectors are subject to a flat 35% profit tax,
based on the residence principle: all firms located in Mexico are treated alike,
independent of the nationality of the owners.  We assume the tax treatment is
similar in USC and RW.  This is de facto true for the US .  As to the RW, there is2
no hope of capturing the diversity of tax practices in the various countries Mexico,
      Annexes containing a detailed description of data sources and calibration3
procedures are available on request.
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the US and Canada trade with at this level of aggregation.  We therefore simply
assume the RW tax system is similar.  The Mexican government purchases a fixed
vector of goods, and sells a fixed quantity of foreign assets (this corresponds to
the balance of trade deficit in the base equilibrium).  Any remaining government
surplus (or deficit) is distributed to the consumer in a lump sum manner.  We
abstract from income distribution issues, so we assume that there is a single
representative Mexican consumer who receives factor income and profits
(excluding income repatriated by foreign firms operating in Mexico) and
government surplus.  We use the utility of the consumer as a measure of welfare. 
3: Data Description and Calibration.3
The main sources for production side data are the 1985 I/O table (adjusted
to 1989 data using the RAS procedure) and the Industrial Survey conducted by
INEGI and complemented by surveys investigating the nationality of ownership of
each firm.  We define a firm as being Mexican if more than 50% of its equity is
Mexican owned.  If not, it is either USC or RW owned according to whether USC
or RW has the larger proportion of equity ownership.
Some of the information derived from this survey is given in table 2.  The
right hand section of this table divides supply according to four types:  Mexican
production
(firms located in Mexico) divided according to nationality of ownership, and USC
production (irrespective of ownership).  The shares of each of these sources of
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supply in the Mexican market is illustrated (and does not add to 100%, because of
RW imports).  We see USC nationality firms located in Mexico are present in all
industries, having significant market shares in other chemicals and vehicles.  RW
owned firms are particularly important in food processing, vehicles and vehicle
parts.
 Table 2:   Industry Characteristics.
Sector Mexican US Return     Firm Share    %sales   %sales
import import to scale loca-   natio- of Mex   going    
tariff tariff tion    nality market   to Mex   to USC
1:Agriculture   30.0%     /    0
Other perfectly   14.8%   3.3%    0
competitive tradables
3:Food processing  11.6%   4.7%   34%         Mex 63.8%     95.0%    4.8% 
Mex  USC  4.2%     87.0%   12.9% 
        RW 24.8%     98.0%    0.7% 
USC    (all)  3.9%                   
7:Heavy chemicals   8.8%   1.9%   30%         Mex 64.6%     76.0%   10.7% 
Mex  USC  4.6%     74.9%    7.8% 
        RW  5.2%     88.4%    5.5% 
USC    (all) 17.7%                   
8:Other chemicals  14.6%   2.5%   27%         Mex 41.0%     93.7%    4.1% 
Mex  USC 33.8%     91.7%    4.7% 
        RW 12.6%     91.9%    5.4% 
USC    (all)  7.3%                   
9:Steel  10.7%   2.1%   17%         Mex 62.9%     85.9%    9.4% 
Mex  USC  5.1%     90.1%    9.6% 
        RW 13.4%     99.8%    0.2% 
USC    (all) 11.8%                   
10:Electrical products  15.9%   4.4%    25%         Mex 28.2%     81.6%   11.1% 
Mex  USC  8.7%     85.9%   13.4% 
        RW  7.8%     91.6%    4.9%  
USC    (all) 32.5%                   
11:Electronics  17.6%     4.4%   25%         Mex 14.1%     34.2%   65.6% 
Mex  USC  2.4%     97.7%    1.0%
        RW 12.9%     75.5%    13.0% 
USC    (all) 30.6%                   
12:Vehicles  30.0%   2.5%   21%         Mex 45.7%     98.8%    1.2% 
Mex  USC 15.8%     79.3%   20.3% 
        RW 35.3%     94.9%    2.8% 
USC    (all)  2.3%                   
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13:Vehicle parts  13.2%   2.5%   21%         Mex 16.6%     37.5%   61.1% 
Mex  USC  1.0%     55.7%   41.8% 
        RW 14.1%     21.1%   57.1% 
USC    (all) 32.9%                   
14:Transport,     /    / Mex     100%    100%      0  
communications &
finance
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An important issue for the results is the extent to which different types of
firms located in Mexico are oriented towards the USC market relative to the
Mexican market (see also Table 2).  In some cases we see that DFI appears to be
supplying the Mexican market exclusively;  USC firms in electronics and RW firms
in food processing, steel and vehicles sell less than 3% of their output to USC. 
Conversely, all suppliers in vehicle parts and Mexican firms in electronics sell
more than 40% of their output to USC.
We also use the industrial survey to derive some of the parameters of the
technology in each sector.  Firms in the industrial sector have a unit cost function
which is linear in intermediates, combines primary factors in a CES cost
aggregator, and may exhibit non-constant returns to scale in the CES cost
aggregator.  Intermediate technical coefficients come from the input output matrix. 
Factor shares in the CES aggregator come from the industrial survey, which
breaks down value added in each industry by skilled labour, unskilled labour, and
capital plus profits.  Returns to scale are estimated econometrically for each sector
on the basis of the industrial survey.  Cost functions were estimated for each
industry under a variety of different specifications.  The best estimates of returns
to scale are given in column 3 of table 2, expressed in the form of the increase in
average costs which would be experienced if a Mexican firm were to reduce its
scale to 50% of its base level.  The estimated returns to scale are significant, and
broadly in line with those found in other studies.  The functional form employed
in the model allows for decreasing average and marginal cost.  (Details of this are
given in the annex).
Furthermore, we allow for possible differences in the efficiency with which
      The lower average tax rate for unskilled labor is due to the personal income4
exemption.  The higher tax rate on capital is chosen to reflect the fact that Mexico's
corporate and personal income tax systems are not integrated, with double taxation
of dividend income as a result.
      This is the basic VAT rate in Mexico. Some luxury products face a higher tax5
and some necessities a lower one; this would only marginally affects sectoral tax rates
at our level and definition of aggregation.
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firms of different nationality use primary factors, and set these differences such
that USC firms are 12.5% more efficient than the Mexican firms, and RW firms are
15% more efficient (see Guffen, van Wijnbergen and Venables (1993) for evidence
on such productivity differences). Finally, firms face different factor prices
according to their location.  We set Mexican unskilled wages at 20% of wages in
the both USC and RW, and Mexican skilled wages at 25% of USC and RW levels. 
The price of capital in Mexico is 125% of that in USC and RW, but this premium
is paid only by Mexican owned firms -- USC and RW firms import capital.
We approximate the Mexican income tax system by a tax on unskilled
labour income of 10%, on skilled labour income of 20%, and on capital and profits,
of 35%.  The 35% rate applies to repatriated as well as retained earnings.  4
Mexican consumption faces a flat 10% consumption tax by assumption.5
Tariff data are aggregated on an import weighted basis for the US (applied
also to Canada) and for Mexico.  The Mexican data were subject to two
adjustments, raising the tariff on vehicles to 30% (from 18%) to capture other trade
barriers, and setting the agricultural tariff at 30%. The automobile correction is
made to capture local content rules, export surplus requirements and a ban on all
imports from companies not actually producing cars in Mexico (cf Lopez-de-
Silanes e.a. (1992) for a more structured treatment of this market).  The 30% tariff
      Transport, communications and finance.6
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rate is in line with price differentials on comparable models once corrections have
been made for differential rates of commodity taxation in the two countries.  The
agricultural tariff adjustment is made to capture the import ban on maize (the rate
is set well below maize price differentials because maize constitutes only a part of
agricultural output; cf Levy and van Wijnbergen (1992b)).  The resulting tariff
structure, aggregated up to our sector classification, is listed in table 2.  Mexican
tariffs are generally around 4 to 5 times higher than USC tariffs.
4: Direct Foreign Investment and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Introducing all NAFTA related trade liberalization measures at once would
more than likely lead to results that are difficult to interpret.  We therefore
introduce groups of measures in stages, in the hope of better clarifying the
mechanisms at work.  In the first step, Mexico unilaterally reduces its tariffs and
other trade barriers in industry (see Table 3 below, Section 4.1).  We then
implement matching USC trade barrier removal, also only in industry (Table 4). 
In the next step (Section 4.2), we also introduce agricultural trade liberalization,
mostly because of the very large impact these measures will have on factor
markets and from there on industry and DFI (Table 5).  In the final step (Section
4.3) we come to the core of this paper and trace the impact of opening up the
service sector  to DFI,both directly and indirectly, through its impact on DFI6
elsewhere (Tables 6, 7 and 8).  This last experiment constitutes a comprehensive
assessment of the FTA, since all steps are taken cumulatively.  Section 4.4 ventures
out beyond the actual agreement and explores the "beach-head Mexico" theory of
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DFI by assessing the impact of US trade policy towards the rest of the world on
DFI in Mexico (Table 9).
We conduct all experiments in two stages.  First, we simulate the effects of
the policy change letting firm scale change, but holding the number of firms (of all
types in all locations) constant.  We refer to this as the short run.  Second, we let
firms enter and exit the industry, and refer to this as the long run.  Different rules
could be followed for determining the entry and exit of firms.  In this paper we
assume that the number of firms located in USC and in RW is held constant, and
the number of firms in Mexico (Mexican, USC and RW) adjusts until their profits
are back to the level of profits they attained in the base run.  Other entry rules are
possible; in runs not reported here we have imposed that entry of a USC or RW
firm in Mexico is associated with exit of a USC or RW firm located in USC.  This
approach simulates relocation of firms, rather than new entry.  Results from this
rule are very similar to those reported here.
4.1 Trade liberalization in industry
Consider initially the implications of trade liberalization in the non-oil
industrial sectors only (sectors 3 - 15), i.e. a unilateral reduction in tariffs in
Mexican industry directed against the USC.  Tables 3A and 3B summarise the
quantitative results.
The results show small effects at the aggregate level, but pronounced effects
at the disaggregate level. Whether an industrial sector expands or contracts
depends essentially on whether the sector is a net exporter or importer in the base
case.  Thus, the electrical products sector experiences a decline in output;  imports
18
from USC have a high share of the Mexican market in this industry (32.5%, table
2), and none of the firms located in Mexico export much of their output to USC (at
most 13.4%, table 2).  Conversely, electronics and vehicle parts experience an
increase in output;  these industries have high import shares, but they also have
firms which are very heavily oriented towards exporting to the USC (over 50% of
sales for Mexican firms in electronics and vehicle parts and RW firms in vehicle
parts), and consequently expand significantly when tariffs are reduced.  However,
notice that USC firms in electronics export almost none of their output (1%, table
3), and are consequently severely squeezed.
The mechanism should be clear: output is reduced in import competing
industries, which now face cheaper imports.  This feeds through into significant
reductions in Mexican factor prices relative to foreign prices (the bracketed
numbers in table 3A) and hence costs.  The resulting real depreciation explains
why the wage falls less (and in the case of unskilled wages, actually increases) in
terms of the CPI.  In response to the changes in factor prices, output expands in
agriculture -- for which protection remains in place in this experiment -- and in
industries which are strongly export oriented, (electronics and vehicle parts).
The net effect of this is, may be surprisingly, a welfare loss, amounting to 1%
of expenditure in the long run.  There are two reasons for this result.  First,
agriculture has expanded -- and is operating with a value marginal product of
labour less than that elsewhere in the economy.  Thus resources are diverted from
a high productivity segment of the economy to a lower productivity sector. 
Second, some of the larger industrial sectors, which are operating with price in
excess of marginal cost, contract under this scenario, leading to a loss of rents. 
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Thus the welfare loss is a classic second best result where the benefits associated
with tariff reductions are more than offset by the impact of those reductions on
existing distortions in the economy: the remaining inefficiencies in agriculture and
the existence of positive price-cost margins and thus suboptimal production levels
in several industries.
It is clear from table 3B that long run effects are generally  magnifications
of short run effects.  Short run expansion is associated with increased profits and
consequent long run entry; but entry by one type of firm reduces profits of all
types of firm in the industry, so firms that do relatively less well in the short run,
may be forced to exit in the long run as competition increases.
Table 3A: Mexican free trade in industrial goods, Aggregate Results
% % Change in factor prices de- Increase in Foreign-Owned
Change flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Capital by Nationality:
in Skilled  Unskilled  Capital
welfare Labour   
Short run  -1.3%  -2.2%      3.0%      -2.0%  USC     -20.1%
(-6.4%)   (-1.5%)    (-5.4%)
Long run  -1.0%  -1.4%      2.7%      -0.3%  ROW      33.5% 
(-5.0%)   (-1.2%)    (-4.1%)
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Table 3B: Mexican free trade in industrial goods, Sectoral Results
 Short Run  Long Run
Sector % Change % Change production by % Change % Change production by
value added firms' nationality: valued firms' nationality
Mex    USC     RW added Mex    USC     RW
  Competitive Sectors
  Agriculture  10.9%   9.2%
  Others  -5.5%  -8.1%
  Imperfectly Competitive Sectors
  Other services   -1.0%  -0.0%
  Food processing   -4.3%   -2%  -11%   -2%  -4.8%  -0%   -80%   -2% 
  Heavy chemicals    4.4%    5%    2%   10%   4.3%   3%   -15%    38%
  Other chemicals   -1.6%   -2%   -3%    2%  -2.3%  -2%   -13%    20%
  Steel    4.6%    4%    3%    3%  11.7%   9%     8%    21%
  Electrical products   -6.5%   -4%  -19%    5% -25.6%  -3%  -100%   -48%
  Electronics   20.8%   25%  -32%   21%  43.5%   36%  -100%    84%
  Vehicles   -6.0%   -7%   -2%   -4%  -8.6%  -5%   -36%   -1% 
  Vehicle parts   23.0%   11%   10%   31% 123.0%   5%   398%  204%
  Transport,    0.6%   0.6%   0      1.3%  1.3%   0   
communications
  & finance
The magnitude of output changes for particular types of firms and
particular industries is large;  it comes directly from the fact that the model is
sparing in its use of 'dampening devices', such as sector specific factors or
Armington assumptions.  We do not regard it as implausible that sectors in which
firms export over 50% of their output should expand dramatically in response to
trade liberalization.
There is, finally, a strong but patterned response of DFI.  Two features
stand out.  First, DFI from outside the NAFTA increases by slightly over 33% as
Mexico becomes a more attractive platform for exports to the US in response to
      The Maquila area refers to the zone just South of the US border where large7
reprocessing activities take place in response to pecularities in the US tariff structure.
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lower factor costs (and tariffs against RW remain in place).  Most of this increase
comes in vehicle parts and electronics, areas where RW firms are strictly oriented
towards the US market.  However, DFI from the US actually falls as direct export
to Mexico becomes more attractive with lower Mexican tariffs.  See in particular
the electronics industry, where US firms outside the Maquila area  direct 97.7% of7
their sales towards the domestic
(Mexican) market.  In the long run, US presence in that market segment stops
altogether.
If unilateral liberalization of industrial trade imposes a welfare cost on
Mexico, what of bilateral liberalization through NAFTA?  Table 4 reports the
effects of a bilateral liberalization of industrial trade for Mexico and USC.
The results are interpreted readily in terms of those from the previous
experiment, bearing in mind that USC base import tariffs are generally 4 to 5
times lower than Mexican ones.  Noteworthy features are the dramatic expansion
of production of electronics and vehicle parts.  These sectors gain from the
reduction in Mexican factor prices relative to foreign prices, and, since they are
heavily export oriented,in addition from USC tariff reductions.  The overall
welfare effect of the experiment is negative, this again being due to the expansion
of the agricultural sector and contraction of some imperfectly competitive
industries.  The DFI response is also similar to what came out in the previous
experiments.
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Table 4A: Mexican AND USC free trade in industrial goods.
% % Change in factor prices de- Increase in Foreign-
Change flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Owned Capital by
in Skilled   Unskilled   Capital Nationality:
welfare Labour   
Short run  -1.1%   -1.8%     2.8%         -0.7%  USC     -15.7%
 (-5.9%)  (-1.4%)       (-4.8%)
Long run  -0.2%   -0.4%     2.3%          0.6%   (-  ROW      47.1%  
3.4%    -0.8%     -2.4%)
Table 4B: Mexican and USC free trade in industrial goods.
 Short Run  Long Run
Sector % Change % Change production by % Change % Change production by
value added firms' nationality: valued firms' nationality
Mex    USC     RW added Mex    USC     RW
Competitive Sectors
Agriculture (1)   10.2%   7.2%
Others   -6.8% -11.4%
Imperfectly Competitive Sectors
Other services (16)   -0.6%   1.2%
Food processing (3)   -2.0%  -1%   -2%   -2%  -3.0%   1%  -59%   -2%
Heavy chemicals (7)    5.0%   6%    3%   10%   2.5%   3%  -26%   18%
Other chemicals (8)   -0.8%  -1%   -2%    3%  -2.0%  -2%  -12%   16%
Steel (9)    6.3%   6%    6%    3%  18.2%  14%   26%   30%
Electrical  products (10)   -3.0%  -1%  -10%   -3% -16.2%  -2% -100%  -51%
Electronics (11)   36.1%  45%  -32%  -31%  77.0%  72% -100%  118%
Vehicles (12)   -4.5%  -7%    6%   -3%  -6.2%  -7%  -18%   -2%
Vehicle parts (13)   31.0%  16%   18%   42% 192.0%   7%  606%  319%
Transport,communicatio    1.3%  1.3%   0      2.7% -2.7%   0    
ns
 & finance (15)
The experiments discussed so far put in sharp focus the importance of
agriculture and its remaining inefficiencies for industrial competitiveness in
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Mexico and Mexico's attractiveness as an export platform towards the US.  This
brings us to the next section, which adds agricultural trade liberalization to the
analysis.
4.2 Trade liberalization in industry and agriculture
We now add to the previous experiment free trade in agriculture. 
Agriculture is an importing sector, protected by an import tariff of (on average)
30%.  The direct effect (holding factor prices constant) of removing trade barriers
is that the volume of agricultural output falls by around 40%.  This is consistent
with the detailed agricultural study of Levy and van Wijnbergen (1992a,b).
Short and long run effects on the economy as a whole are given in table 5
and are radically different from the industry-alone runs.  The key difference
between this experiment and the previous one is that the release of unskilled
labour from agriculture reduces the equilibrium wage of unskilled labour, by
some 17 - 18% relative to prices and wages in USC and RW.  Such a major
reduction in unskilled wages of course benefits all other sectors of the economy; 
the sectors that use unskilled labour most intensively are electrical products and
motor vehicle parts, and it benefits these most.  Also noteworthy are the changed
fortunes of the food processing industry.  This contracted in the previous
experiment, but now expands, on the basis of lower priced agricultural inputs.
 Aggregate welfare gains from the experiment are now positive and of a
significant order of magnitude, reaching 1.6% of base income in the short run, and
3.15% in the long run -- in an experiment which directly affects less than half of
the economy.  Measuring changes in factor prices relative to the consumer price
index we see considerable gains for skilled labour (long run 7.6%) and capital
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(long run 4.7%).  Unskilled labour suffers a significant reduction, however, of
around 12.5%.  But this is in terms of the overall consumer price index; the price
of agricultural products has fallen significantly more than the index as a whole --
because of the direct effect of the reduction in agricultural protection.  Relative to
agricultural products the unskilled wage increases by around 13%. Since the rural
poor tend to consume more agricultural products (Levy (1991)), the impact of this
package of reforms on their welfare is about neutral.
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Table 5A: Mexican and USC free trade in industrial and agricultural goods
% % Change in factor prices de- Increase in Foreign-Owned
Change flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Capital by Nationality:
in Skilled  Unskilled  Capital
welfare Labour   
Short run   1.6%    4.3%    -12.5%       4.9% USC     25.4%
 (-3.1%)  (-18.7%)    (-2.5%)
Long run   3.2%    7.6%    -12.4%       4.7% ROW     66.3%  
  (1.5%)  (-17.3%)     (1.1%)
Table 5B: Mexican and USC free trade in industrial and agricultural goods
 Short Run  Long Run
Sector % Change % Change production by % Change % Change production
value added firms' nationality: valued by firms' nationality
Mex    USC     RW added Mex    USC     RW
Competitive Sectors
Agriculture (1)  -36.3%  -40%
Others   11.4%    3%
Imperfectly Competitive Sectors
Other services (16)    3.6%    7%
Food processing (3)   17.6%   10%  77%    12%    2.7%   3%   405%   10%
Heavy chemicals (7)   13.4%   14%   14%   22%   10.4%   9%   -14%   32%
Other chemicals (8)    4.4%    3%    3%    9%    3.3%   1%    -5%   21%
Steel (9)   14.5%   14%   17%   11%   32.0%  24%    74%   51%
Electrical products (10)    6.8%    8%    5%   11%  -12.8%   6%  -100%   -2%
Electronics (11)   48.5%   56%  -24%   44%   96.6%  82%  -100%  160%
Vehicles (12)    0.3%   -4%   17%    1%    0.6%  -6%    11%    1%
Vehicle parts (13)   41.2%   24%   30%    55%  256.0%  11%  1900%  390%
Transport,communications &    4.7%   4.7%    0         8.0%   8%        0      
finance (15)
The impact on DFI of adding agricultural trade liberalization to the
experiment is dramatic. Agricultural trade liberalization, through its impact on
wages, leads to such an improvement in competitiveness that both US and RW
investment in Mexico increase substantially. While there are still some sectors
26
where the US basically withdraws or reduces its presence (electronics, chemicals,
electrical products), that is more than offset by strong expansion almost
everywhere else (see Table 5B).  In particular food processing and vehicle parts
profit from a large influx of US investment.  RW investment increases across the
board both in the short run and in the long run.  This experiment clearly indicates
the drag agricultural protection is currently exercising on industrial
competitiveness in Mexico.
4.3 NAFTA and liberalization of transport, communications and finance  
In experiments conducted so far, Mexican access to USC markets has
benefited from a reduction in USC import tariffs.  However, these tariff levels pale
into insignificance alongside the transport and communications costs of
undertaking trade between Mexico and USC.  Industry interviews indicate that
these costs may well take up 30 to 40% of total costs; when coupled with evidence
that these sectors are operating at cost levels several times higher than those of
their US equivalents (Musalem e.a. (1991)), the special importance of opening up
the transport and communications sectors should be clear.
This sector of the Mexican economy is entirely closed to foreign firms, and
is characterized by only limited domestic competition.  Not surprisingly therefore, 
factor productivity levels in Mexican firms are much lower than in comparable
USC firms -- estimates reported in Musalem et alii (1991) have put them at one
third for banking and insurance.  The experiment we conduct in this section is to
add to the experiment of the preceding section the following:  USC firms with
      On the presumption that the productivity differences in the subsectors not8
covered by Musalem et alii are smaller than those found in their study.
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factor productivity double  that of Mexican firm enter the service sector (transport,8
communications and finance).  The cost levels including intermediates of these
firms are 60% of those of Mexican firms.  We simulate the effects of entry under
two different entry rules: (A) restricted entry; (B) unrestricted entry.  In all cases,
factors move across borders, but products do not.  This is in line with the
structure of the NAFTA agreement in financial services, which allows operation of
foreign firms through subsidiaries but disallows cross-border product trade or
even branch operations.  A crucial assumption is that when a foreign firm
establishes a subsidiary in Mexico, it operates at foreign levels of efficiency.
Under rule (A) we allow USC firms to take a long run share of one third of
the market.  Results are reported in table 6.  Two new forces are at work.  First,
and most important although obviously not surprising, the price of sector 15
output drops substantially, which in turn lowers the costs of exporting from
Mexico substantially.  Second, the substantial reduction of output by domestic
firms in this sector (slightly less than one third) releases skilled labour into the
economy, leading to an overall drop in the real skilled labour wage.
The sectors that expand most dramatically are those that benefit from the
reduction in trading costs. Most notable are electrical products -- where
contraction now becomes expansion; electronics, where output more than doubles;
and vehicles where output increases by a factor of more than 5 -- although still
accounting for only around 3% of GDP.
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Table 6A: NAFTA with partial US entry in transportation and financial services.
% % Change in factor prices (de- Increase in Foreign-Owned
Change flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Capital by Nationality:
in Skilled   Unskilled   Capital
welfare Labour    
Short run   2.4%    1.4%     -11.3%        5.6%  USC   59.9%
 (-7.5%)   (-19.1%)     (-3.7%)
Long run   5.0%    5.4%     -11.2%        8.7%  ROW   92.2%
 (-1.6%)   (-17.1%)      (1.6%)
Table 6B: NAFTA with partial US entry in transportation and financial services.
 Short Run  Long Run
Sector % Change % Change production % Change % Change production
value by firms' nationality: valued by firms' nationality
added Mex    USC     RW added Mex    USC     RW
Competitive Sectors
Agriculture (1)  -33.6%  -38.7%
Others   19.2%    6.4%
Imperfectly Competitive Sectors
Other services (16)    5.4%    4.5%
Food processing (3)   21.0%  13%    99%   15%   36.5%   37%   583%   12%
Heavy chemicals (7)   21.1%  21%    27%   10%   18.7%   15%    10%   59%
Other chemicals (8)    9.5%   7%    10%   16%    9.4%    4%     3%   32%
Steel (9)   22.4%  23%    32%   18%   50.0%   36%   160%   74%
Electrical products (10)   18.8%  18%    26%   27%   14.5%   11%   -14%   55%
Electronics (11)   64.7%  73%   -15%   62%  131.3%  102%  -100%  237%
Vehicles (12)    4.9%  -3%   34%     4%    9.0%   -8%     63%     0%
Vehicle parts (13)   53.3%   3%   43%    71%  450.0%   14%  3380%  516%
Transport, communications   -1.0% -34%   ++    0    4.5%  -31%    ++       0
& finance (15)
The impact on DFI is major.  DFI from all sources almost doubles compared
to the previous case, which was an identical experiment except that the services
sector remained closed to foreign-owned companies.  Most of the new DFI flows
to export based industries; as a consequence, raising aggregate exports
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substantially.  The overall effect on welfare also increases substantially, to 2.4%
and 5% of GDP in the short and long run respectively.  The message should be
clear: even a moderate opening up in the services sector will substantially increase
the benefits Mexico can obtain from the NAFTA, and is essential for a strong DFI
response
Consider next the fully unrestricted entry case.  Now the price of sector 15
output drops by no less than 40%.  This amounts to a 10 percentage points
reduction in trade costs which is several times larger than the reduction in USC
tariffs.  In fact, it means that the combined barrier of trade costs plus tariffs on
sales from Mexico to USC is now reduced by an amount approximately equal to
the reduction in Mexican import tariffs.  The second force at work is that
productivity gains in sector 15 release a considerable amount of skilled labour.  In
the long run the price of skilled labour falls (relative to foreign labour) by 4.1%,
whereas, without service sector liberalisation, it rose by 1.5%.
The welfare effects of this experiment are startling (Table 7).  In the short
run, welfare increases by 5.5%, and in the long run by 14.2%.  This comes from
significant expansion of imperfectly competitive industrial sectors; from the
contraction of agriculture with its low marginal product of labour; and from
increased factor productivity in sector 15.  This sector accounts for 11% of GDP
and, in the long run, factor productivity in this sector is doubled by the
experiment.  Looking at returns to factors of production, we see that unskilled
labour does rather better in this experiment than in the previous one, though it
still loses relative to the consumer price index.  Skilled labour does less well,
although it still gains.  Capital does much better, with its real price increasing by
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17%; this reflects the fact that Mexican owned production expands, as well as
foreign owned.  This expansion has to draw capital from the Mexican capital
market, and neither of the contracting sectors -- agriculture nor transport,
communications and finance -- are capital intensive.
Table 7: Unrestricted US entry in transportation and financial services
% Change % Change in factor prices (de- Increase in Foreign-
in welfare flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Owned Capital by
Skilled   Unskilled   Capital Nationality:
 Labour    Labour
Short   5.5%    5.6%      -6.3%      9.4%  USC   197%
run  (-7.4%)   (-17.8%)   (-3.9%)
Long  14.2%    5.4%      -7.0%      17.1%  ROW   127%
run  (-4.1%)   (-15.3%)     (6.6%)
DFI increases substantially as trading costs in Mexico fall.  This experiment
and the one where agricultural liberalization alone was added to the industrial
elements of the NAFTA both point in the same direction: substantial welfare
benefits can be expected, but will only materialize if and when agriculture and
services are also opened up to foreign entry.
All of the spectacular effects of the last two experiments came from the
replacement of inefficient domestic firms in services by one or more efficient
foreign firms.  In reality one would expect to see substantial cost reduction to take
place in the domestic part of the sector too; this has been the pattern in Spain for
example, after its entry in the EC and the ensuing foreign entry in banking.  Our
final experiment in this subsection therefore traces the consequences of bringing
the domestic services sector up to international standards.
In this experiment no foreign entry takes place in the services sector, but
there are similar beneficial effects as extensive foreign entry would have had on
31
the rest of the economy, as output costs fall to a similar degree in this sector. 
Thus one can expect similar effects on DFI in the rest of the economy, and even
slightly larger welfare benefits (cf Table 7), since now all rents earned in the
industry stay in Mexico, instead of only the 35% captured by the corporate income
tax.  This experiment indicates the potentially large benefits that better regulatory
control over monopoly practices and improved competition policy could yield in
Mexico's service sector!
Table 8: NAFTA without services, but domestic productivity improvements to
foreign levels in services
% Change % Change in factor prices de- Increase in Foreign-
in welfare flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Owned Capital by
Skilled   Unskilled   Capital Nationality:
 Labour    Labour
Short  11.4%    -2.2%     -9.0%     14.5%  USC   130.3%
run  (-12.7%)  (-18.9%)    (2.2%)
Long  15.8%     2.5%     -9.1%     19.2%  ROW    99.6%  
run   (-5.9%)  (-16.5%)    (9.5%)
4.4  NAFTA and the "Beach-head" Theory of DFI: the Impact of Higher US external
     Tariffs.
Our final experiment speculates about the possible effect on Mexico of the
US (and Canada) adopting a more aggressive trade policy towards the rest of the
world by raising import tariffs on non-NAFTA imports by 20%.  We assume that
these tariffs only apply to the sectors which we have modelled as imperfectly
competitive on the presumption that lobbying power is concentrated in those
industries.  The assumptions on the rest of NAFTA are those of Table 5 (free trade
in industry and agriculture).
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The effects of this change are to make Mexico more attractive as a location
for investment by firms from RW.  This is documented in table 8.  RW exports to
USC from outside NAFTA are now more expensive in the US, so RW production
in Mexico increases substantially.  Increased supply from these firms induces some
contraction of USC firms, and, as usual, these effects are magnified once entry and
exit are allowed.  The effect of increased RW activity in Mexico is to raise Mexican
factor prices, to substantially increase DFI once entry is allowed (i.e. the long run)
and a substantial consequent increase in Mexican welfare.  Long run welfare
increases by 4.8% instead of by 3.2% as in the case of Table 5 (same NAFTA set
up but without the increase in USC external tariffs).  Thus the net welfare effect of
higher USC tariffs is no less than 1.6% of Mexican GDP (keep in mind, though,
that a 20 percentage point increase in external tariffs, even if only in the non-
competitive sectors, is a major increase in protection).
Table 9: Higher USC external tariff of 20%
% Change % Change in factor prices de- Increase in Foreign-
in welfare flated by CPI (Foreign Prices): Owned Capital by
Skilled  Unskilled  Capital nationality:
 Labour   Labour
Short   1.8%     4.7%   -12.7%      5.4%  USC     5.8%
run   (-2.3%) (-18.5%)   (-1.6%)
Long   4.8%     8.8%    -13.1%     9.2%  ROW   139.7%  
run    (4.6%)  (-16.4%)   (5.0%)
5: Conclusions
Much of the excitement around the NAFTA has been generated by
anticipations of a strong foreign investment response. Nevertheless, the plethora of
33
applied papers about the NAFTA have all either ignored DFI or kept it exogenous.
In this paper we provide support, with empirical underpinning, for the
anticipation of a strong DFI response; however this support is qualified by the
demonstration that no such DFI response will be forthcoming unless the NAFTA
is used to drastically reform the agriculture and services sectors in Mexico.
The analytical framework used focuses on the implications of economies of
scale, trading costs and size difference between the countries concerned for the
plant location and export structure choice of multinational firms.  Much effort has
been devoted to empirically estimating all the important parameters pinning down
the production structure, in contrast to the more "off-the-shelf" CGE models used
so far in the analysis of the NAFTA.
While the analysis suggests a strong DFI response to the NAFTA as a
whole, industrial free trade alone produces no such result. In fact, US DFI is
predicted to actually decline in response to tariff cutting in industry alone, as
exporting to Mexico becomes cheaper while the cost of services in Mexico remains
at two to three times their US levels. This is to some extent offset by the
prediction of higher DFI from regions outside North America into Mexico.  The
impact on welfare shows only minor efficiency gains which, in general
equilibrium, are just offset by the fact that some high-rent industries contract and
that resources flow into less efficient but still protected agriculture. Overall a small
decline in welfare, both in the short run and in the long run, occurs.
These somewhat lacklustre results are reversed dramatically once
liberalization of agriculture and services are brought in. A point that is clearly
highlighted in these experiments is the importance of agriculture and its
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remaining inefficiencies for industrial competitiveness in Mexico and Mexico's
attractiveness as an export platform towards the US.  The experiments sofar
suggest that the objective of the NAFTA will not be realized without liberalizing
agriculture and so releasing the labor that continues to be employed in low value
added activities in that sector. But if agriculture is liberalized, Mexico can not only
expect a substantial DFI response to the NAFTA, both from the US and elsewhere,
but also substantial welfare gains.
Once services are brought in, with their pre-liberalization costs at two-to-
three times those in the US, the results become truly spectacular. Since the high
cost of services act as a strong deterrent to producing in and exporting from
Mexico, cutting services' costs by two has a major impact on plant location choice
in favour of Mexico. This also leads to major welfare gains from the NAFTA as a
whole, well into double digit percentages of GDP.
The analysis clearly demonstrates the importance of distinguishing DFI by
source country. In response to a NAFTA in industry alone, DFI from the rest of
the world rises, while DFI from the US actually falls.  This distinction is also
important in our last experiment, aimed at highlighting a more intangible
argument behind the DFI response to NAFTA, the possibility of higher US
external tariffs. Such a tariff increase, compatible with the NAFTA agreement
which after all is not a customs union, triggers a substantial DFI response from
outside the NAFTA region.
In the end, the conclusions for policy are clear.  Small tariff changes do little
for welfare.  But general equilibrium matters -- reform of the most sheltered
sectors in Mexico (agriculture and services), sectors that supply industry directly
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or indirectly, will have dramatic effects on industrial performance, welfare and
DFI in Mexico.
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